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Abstract
Industrial control systems (ICS) are increasingly at risk and vulnerable to internal and external threats. These
systems are integral part of our nation’s critical infrastructures. Consequently, a successful cyberattack on one
of these could present disastrous consequences to human life and property as well. It is imperative that
cybersecurity professionals gain a good understanding of these systems particularly in the area of
communication protocols. Traditional Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) are made to encapsulate some of these ICS protocols which may enable malicious payload to get
through the network firewall and thus, gain entry into the network. This paper describes technical details on
various ICS protocols and a suite of ICS protocol packets for the purpose of providing digital forensic
materials for laboratory exercises toward a better understanding of the inner workings of ICS
communications. Further, these artifacts can be useful in devising deep packet inspection (DPI) strategies
that can be implemented in network firewalls, in expanding challenge materials for cyber competitions, and in
attribution, vulnerability assessment, and penetration testing research in ICS security. We also present
software tools that are available for free download on the Internet that could be used to generate simulated
ICS and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) communication packets for research and
pedagogical purposes. Finally, we conclude the paper by presenting possible research avenues that can be
pursued as extensions to this seminal work on ICS security. Prominent among these possible extensions is the
expansion of the ICS packet suite to include those protocols in the wireless domain such as Wi-Fi (802.11),
Bluetooth, Zigbee, and other protocols that utilizes proprietary Radio Frequency.
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INTRODUCTION 
 Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are increasingly at risk and vulnerable to 
internal and external threats. These systems are integral to our nation’s critical 
infrastructures. Consequently, a successful cyberattack on one of these systems 
could present disastrous consequences to human life and property as well. It is 
imperative that cybersecurity professionals gain a good understanding of these 
systems particularly in the area of communication protocols. Traditional 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) are 
made to encapsulate some of these ICS protocols which may enable malicious 
payload to get through the network firewall and thus, gain entry into the network. 
The contribution of this paper is to describe a suite of ICS protocol packets for the 
purpose of providing digital forensic materials for laboratory exercises toward a 
better understanding of the inner working of ICS communications. These artifacts 
can also be useful in devising deep packet inspection (DPI) strategies and tools 
that can be implemented in network firewalls. Lastly, we hope that this collection 
of captured ICS packets could further enhance cybersecurity education and 
training particularly in ICS packet analysis and attribution, vulnerability analysis, 
penetration testing, and challenge materials for cyber competitions. 
The rest of the paper is organized into three parts. First, we present a literature 
review of ICS protocols and technologies, deep packet inspection, and ICS packet 
generation and analysis. Second, we provide a technical overview and packet 
structure description of the prominent ICS protocols. Furthermore, we examine 
the details of a representative sample packet for each protocol and highlighted the 
essential components that define each protocol. Finally, we provide concluding 
remarks and present possible research avenues that can be pursued as extensions 
to this work. 
BACKGROUND  
 Industrial control system protocols range from wired to wireless. Wired 
protocols include Ethernet Industrial Protocol (Ethernet/IP), Common Industrial 
Protocol (CIP), Modbus, Modbus Transmission Control Protocol (Modbus/TCP), 
Distributed Network Protocol version3 (DNP3), Process Field Bus (Profibus), 
DeviceNet, Controller Area Network (CAN, 2013), and Ethernet for Control 
Automation Technology (EtherCAT). The wireless variety includes 
WirelessHART, 802.15 (Bluetooth), 802.16 (Broadband) and IEEE 802.15.4 
(Zigbee) (Francia & Francia, 2013). With the ever increasing risk that ICS are 
being subjected to, it is imperative that cybersecurity professionals gain a good 
understanding of the communication protocols with which these systems operate 
and the threats that exist in securing them. 
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Deep Packet Inspection 
 Packet filters found in network devices are the first line of defense against 
malicious packets. Deep packet inspection is a small part of the filtering 
techniques that are adopted by security providers in their commercial products. A 
non-exhaustive list of techniques is presented in (Franz & Pothamsetty, 2004) and 
they include the following: 
 Layer 2 filtering using intelligent switches/bridges; 
 Access Control Lists on Layer 3 and 4 using routers; 
 Stateful Firewall filtering; 
 Application Proxy filtering; and 
 Deploying DPI and Intrusion Prevention Systems. 
Obviously there is a great need for developing filters that are creatively 
constructed using DPI and intelligent mechanisms. These filters can then be 
applied on fields and values in control systems. These fields might include 
register read and write commands, controlled objects, and service requests (Byres, 
2016). 
Deep Packet Inspection is the process of allowing packet inspecting devices, such 
as firewalls and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), to perform an in-depth 
analysis of packet contents. This in-depth analysis is much broader than common 
technologies in that it combines protocol anomaly detection and signature 
scanning to realize its potential (Ramos, 2009). For more comprehensive literature 
reviews on various tools and techniques for the development of DPI systems, the 
astute reader is referred to the work of (Antonello, et al., 2012).  
ICS Protocol Packet Generation and Sources 
 The collection of ICS protocol packet captures consists of 30 files 
representing 12 different ICS protocols that include, among others, CIP, DNP3, 
IEC 60870, EtherCAT, Ethernet/IP, Modbus, Hart, and BACnet. While a number 
of these files were generated in our Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Assessment Laboratory (CISAL) (Francia, Bekhouche, & Marbut, 2011), 
additional files came from multiple sources on the Internet and were compiled by 
Jason Smith on GitHub (Smith, 2016). Additionally, IEC 60870 packets were 
generated using two simulation tools: QTester104 and WinPP104. QTester104 is 
an implementation of the IEC60870-5-104 protocol for substation data acquisition 
and control over TCP/IP network (Ricardolo, 2016). WinPP104 is another 
implementation of the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol for listening and simulation of 
tele-control center and substation (Fink, 2016). 
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ICS Protocol Packet Capture and Analysis 
 ICS packet capture and analysis can be accomplished using a freely 
available tool called Wireshark (Wireshark 2.0.5, 2016). This network packet 
analyzer tool provides a mechanism to drill down into each packet. This is a very 
convenient tool to use especially with ICS packets since the control information 
is, most likely, encapsulated by the traditional protocol frames such as TCP and 
UDP. Furthermore, the Wireshark website provides packet capture samples 
(Wireshark Sample Captures, 2016) on a number of popular ICS protocol packets.  
ICS PROTOCOLS 
 The following subsections will provide technical details on various ICS 
protocols with emphasis on their specific packet structure. The purpose of 
providing these details is to enable the reader to understand and interpret the 
information that is being uncovered when doing a deep packet inspection using 
Wireshark. However, due to space constraints, we simply provide what we 
believe is essential to get started in ICS packet analysis. It is still incumbent for 
the reader to follow the references cited within to get a deeper understanding of 
each protocol’s technical details. 
Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) 
 The Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 (DNP3) is a protocol 
standard to define communications between Remote Terminal Units (RTU), 
master stations, and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). It was originally a 
proprietary model developed by Harris Controls Division and designed for 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. DNP3 is a 
master/slave control system protocol and is an accepted standard by the electric, 
oil & gas, waste/water, and security industries (Clarke, Reynders, & Wright, 
2004). There are numerous system architectural configurations for DNP3. A 
typical multi-drop configuration that includes one master station and multiple 
outstation devices is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. A DNP3 Multi-drop System Architecture 
 
DNP3 is a four-layer subset of the OSI 7 layer model. The layers are the 
application, data link, physical, and pseudo-transport layers. The pseudo-transport 
layer includes routing, flow control of data packets, and transport functions such 
DNP3 
Master 
DNP3 
Outstation 
DNP3 
Outstation 
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as error-correction and assembly/disassembly of packets (Clarke, Reynders, & 
Wright, 2004). The data link header contains two Start bytes (0x0564) that help 
the receiver determine where the frame begins. The Length specifies number of 
octets of the remainder of the frame excluding the Cyclic Redundancy Check 
(CRC) section. The Data Link Control octet is used for the sending and receiving 
link layers for coordination (Curtis, 2005). The DNP3 data link frame is depicted 
in Figure 2. 
HEADER DATA SECTION
SYNC
2 bytes
LENGTH
1 byte
LINK CONTROL
1 byte
DESTINATION 
ADDRESS 
2 bytes
SOURCE 
ADDRESS
2 bytes
CRC
2 bytes
 
Figure 2. The DNP3 Data Link Frame 
 
The 2-octet Destination Address specifies which DNP3 device should process the 
data, and the 2-byte Source Address identifies the DNP3 device sender. With the 
2-byte addressing scheme, there are over 65,500 available addresses in which 
every DNP3 device is required to have a unique address for sending and receiving 
messages to and from each other. Three destination addresses are reserved by 
DNP3 as broadcast addresses. The data payload is divided into blocks with each 
block containing a pair of CRC octets for every 16 data octets except for the last 
block.   
The pseudo-transport layer has the responsibility of breaking long application 
layer messages into smaller packets sized for the link layer to transmit, and, when 
receiving, to reassemble frames into longer application layer messages (Curtis, 
2005). Note that the data link layer can only handle a maximum of 250 data 
octets. 
The application layer fragments a message depending on the receiver’s buffer size 
which ranges between 2048 to 4096 bytes. Consequently, a fragment of size 2048 
must be broken into 9 frames by the transport layer before passing on to the data 
link layer. 
Included in our ICS protocol packet suite is a DNP3 packet capture file with a 
write activity. The packet capture file is contributed by B. Wilkerson and can be 
found in the Wireshark sample capture repository (Wireshark Sample Captures, 
2016). Figure 4 illustrates Wireshark’s Packet List pane which displays the DNP3 
packet. Figure 5 provides the details of the DNP3 packet. Particularly of interest 
are the Start bytes (0x0564), the source address (0x0003), the destination address 
(0x0004), and the function code (0x02).    
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Figure 4. Wireshark Packet List Pane with the DNP3 Pcap File 
 
Figure 5. Wireshark Packet Details Pane with the DNP3 Packet Information 
 
Modbus 
 Modbus, the most widely deployed ICS protocol, is an application layer 
messaging protocol. Transactions can either be a query/response type, where only 
a single slave is addressed, or a broadcast/no response type where all slaves are 
addressed. The three major implementations of Modbus include: 
o Modbus Plus - a high speed token passing network; 
o Asynchronous serial communication; and  
o Modbus TCP – TCP/IP over Ethernet encapsulation. 
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The Modbus protocol specifies the Protocol Data Unit (PDU), which is comprised 
by the function code and the data field, and is independent of the underlying 
communication layers. A summary of the most important function codes is shown 
in Table 1. Additional fields such as the address and error-check fields augment 
the PDU to complete the Application Data Unit (ADU) (Modbus.org, 2012).  The 
generic Modbus frame is depicted in Figure 6. 
 
FUNCTION CODE DESCRIPTION 
0x01 Read Coils 
0x02 Read Discrete Inputs 
0x03 Read Holding Registers 
0x04 Read Input Registers 
0x05 Write Single Coil 
0x06 Write Single Register 
0x07 Read Exception Status 
0x08 Diagnostics 
0x0F Write Multiple Coils 
0x10 Write Multiple Registers 
0x11 Report Server ID 
0x14 Read File Record 
0x15 Write File Record 
0x16 Mask Write Register 
0x17 Read/Write Multiple Registers 
Table 1. Modbus Function Code Descriptions 
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Function Code Data Error-CheckAddress
 
Figure 6. A Generic Modbus Frame 
 
The single octet Address field identifies the controller/device to which the 
request/response is being directed. The single octet Function Code can be any 
code from one of these three categories: Public, User-defined, and Reserve 
function codes. The Data field contains the information that is being requested, 
the exception code, or the information, such as the addresses and number of 
registers, which are being passed to the server. The Error-Check field contains the 
Longitudinal Redundancy Check (LRC) information for the ASCII mode and for 
the RTU mode, the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) information.  
The Modbus organization, Modbus.org, extended the Modbus protocol to work 
over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) by encapsulating the Modbus PDU 
with the Modbus TCP ADU (Thomas, 2008). This protocol is registered to utilize 
port 502 and is realized by augmenting the standard Modbus PDU with a Modbus 
Application Protocol (MBAP) header as shown in Figure 7. 
Function Code DataUIDLenPIDTID
MBAP Header
 
Figure 7. Modbus TCP ADU 
 
The MBAP Header is made up the following: a two-octet Transaction Identifier 
(TID), a two-octet Protocol Identifier (PID), a two-octet total length (Len) in 
bytes of the remaining fields, and an octet indicating the Unit Identifier (UID) 
which identifies the remote slave connected by a serial line (Modbus.org, 2012). 
Our ICS protocol packet suite includes multiple Modbus packet captures utilizing 
several of the functions codes shown in Table 1. These packet capture files were 
generated in our Critical Infrastructure Security and Assessment Laboratory 
(CISAL) and Control System Toolkit. These equipment are shown in Figures 8 
and 9, respectively. While Figure 10 shows a listing of the captured packets, 
Figure 11 provides the details of the Modbus/TCP packet capture. The detailed 
report reveals the port number (502) that is intrinsic to a Modbus/TCP 
implementation and the function code that is carried by the transaction.  
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Figure 8. The CISAL Laboratory   Figure 9. The Control System 
Toolkit 
 
Figure 10. Wireshark Packet List Pane with the Modbus/TCP Pcap File 
Figure 11. Wireshark Packet Details Pane with the Modbus/TCP Packet Information 
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IEC 60870.5 
 IEC 60870.5 is an open standard created by the International 
Electromechanical Commission (IEC) for the transmission of SCADA telemetry 
control and data (Clarke, Reynders, & Wright, 2004). Of particular interest in this 
paper is IEC 60870-5-104, a companion standard which defines the transport of 
controls and data of a SCADA system over TCP/IP networks. 
A portion of the generic protocol frame structure of the IEC 60870-5-104 
companion standard, termed as the Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU), is 
shown in Figure 12. The Application Protocol Control Information (APCI) is 
comprised of the first 6 octets and the remainder of the APDU contains the 
Application Service Data Unit (ASDU). The APCI control field can be either one 
of the following types: Information, Supervisory, or Unnumbered. These are very 
similar to the control fields used in High-level Data Link Control (HDLC), a 
synchronous data link layer protocol developed by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) (Tanenbaum & Wetherall, 2010). The Control Field 
structure for the Information type is shown in Figure 13. The two least significant 
bits indicate the type APCI control field, i.e. 10 for supervisory, 11 for 
unnumbered, and 0- for information. 
 
Figure 12. Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) Generic Structure 
 
The ASDU structure includes the data unit identifier and the data payload of one 
or more information objects. The data unit identifier defines the specific type of 
data, the address determines the identity of data, and the Cause of Transmission 
(COT). The COT is used to interpret the information received at the destination. 
The 8-bit wide code types, shown in Table 2, identify the 58 groups that are 
currently defined. Furthermore, information code references, defined in IEC 
60870-5-5, are provided in the ASDU. For instance, code type number 9 has 
reference code M_ME_NA_1 indicating “Measured value, Normalized value.”  
Detailed descriptions of all type group and reference codes are found in (Clarke, 
Reynders, & Wright, 2004). 
  
Control 2 Control 3 Control 4 ASDU Start (0x68) Length Control 1 
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Figure 13. Control Field Information Type Structure 
 
CODE TYPE RANGE GROUP 
1-21, 30-40 Process information in monitor direction 
45-51 Process information in control direction 
70 System information in monitor direction 
100-106 System information in control direction 
110-113 Parameter in control direction 
120-126 File Transfer 
Table 2. Code Type Groups 
 
Just like Modbus/TCP is tied to specific port (504), IEC 60870-5-104 is assigned 
TCP port number 2404. Thus, deciphering and identifying ICS packets, at least 
for these two protocols, would be much easier by focusing on the port numbers 
that are being used for communications. 
  
Send Sequence Number 0 
Send Sequence Number 
Receive Sequence Number 0 
Receive Sequence Number 
Control Field 1 
Control Field 2 
Control Field 3 
Control Field 4 
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Our ICS protocol packet suite includes several IEC 60870-5-104 packet capture 
files. Figure 14 depicts the ACPI and ASDU components of the packet structure. 
Figure 15 provides the details of transmission such as control type, code, transmit 
and receive sequence numbers, and reference descriptions. A careful scrutiny of 
the information provided would reveal the following information: ASDU type 
code 50 with reference C_SE_NC_1 (“Set point command, short floating point 
number”), the APCI is Information type with Transmission sequence number 74 
and Receive sequence number 16, the cause of transmission (COT) is 3 
(Spontaneous), the Information Object Address (IOA) of 12, and a floating point 
value of 9.87. 
Figure 14. IEC 60870-5-104 Packet List 
 
 
Figure 15. A Snapshot of IEC 60870-5-104 Packet Details 
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EtherNet/IP 
 EtherNet/Industrial Protocol (EtherNet/IP) a member of the Common 
Industrial Protocol (CIP) provides the network tools to deploy standard Ethernet 
technology to enable industrial automation applications and enterprise 
connectivity for data and control. This protocol runs over TCP/IP or UDP/IP. 
TCP/IP uses the reserved port 0xAF12 (44818) for transmitting explicit messages 
while UDP/IP uses the reserved port 0x08AE (2222) for transmitting I/O 
messages. A typical Ethernet frame with the encapsulated EtherNet/IP data and 
the encapsulated packet format are shown in Figures 16 and 17, respectively 
(Schiffer, 2016).  
 
Ethernet 
Header
IP 
Header
TCP or 
UDP 
Header
EtherNet/IP
Encapsulation 
Header
EtherNet/IP
Encapsulation 
Data
Ethernet 
Trailer
 
Figure 16. Ethernet Frame with Encapsulated EtherNet/IP 
 
Cmd
2 octets
Len
2 octets
Session 
Handle
4 octets
Status
4 octets
Sender 
Context
8 octets
Options
4 octets
Command Specific Data
0-65511 octets
ENCAPSULATION HEADER ENCAPSULATION DATA
 
Figure 17. Encapsulation Packet Format 
 
The two-octet command (Cmd) field represents various types of commands such 
as broadcast, session opening and closing, and receiving and sending data for 
connected and unconnected messaging (Francia & Francia, 2013).   
 
Figure 18. Packet Details of Ethernet/IP over UDP 
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Figure 19. Packet Details of Ethernet/IP over TCP 
 
EtherCAT 
 EtherCAT stands for Ethernet for Control Automation Technology. It is a 
control system protocol that is mainly used to satisfy very high performance 
requirements in the manufacturing environment. For a typical 1000 distributed 
points the update time is approximately 30 microseconds (Digital Bond, 2016). 
The format of an EtherCAT UDP frame is shown in Figure 20. The EtherCAT 
telegram consist of one or more datagrams, each serving a particular memory area 
of the logical process images of up to 4 GB in size. The EtherCAT telegram 
header consists of a length field, a reserve field, and a type field which indicates 
the nature of the data carried by the EtherCAT telegram (EtherCAT Technology 
Group, 2016). ICS communication messages are transported and encapsulated on 
EtherCAT as a UDP payload using port 0x88A4 (34990). EtherCAT is highly 
susceptible to Denial of Service (DoS) and spoofing attacks due to lack of 
authentication (Knapp & Langill, December 2014). 
 
Our ICS protocol packet suite includes an EtherCAT packet capture file 
downloaded from the Wireshark sample capture file repository (Wireshark 
Sample Captures, 2016). Details of the contents of the EtherCAT telegram are 
shown in Figure 21. Points of interest on this EtherCAT packet snapshot are the 
following: the Ethernet frame type: EtherCAT (0x88a4), the Broadcast Write 
command (BWR) with data value 1100 as the first datagram command, the 
Broadcast Read (BRD) starting at slave address 0x0130, and the Auto Increment 
Physical Read (APRD) datagram command.  
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Figure 20. EtherCAT Telegram Structure with UDP (Digital Bond, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 21. Packet Details of EtherCAT over UDP 
 
Profibus 
 Process Fieldbus (Profibus) is an open fieldbus serial network standard, 
and is mainly used for real-time control applications. The protocol operates on the 
application, data link, and physical layers of the OSI model. Profibus comes in 
three forms: Profibus Process Automation (PA), Decentralized Peripherals (DP), 
and Profibus Fieldbus Message Specification (FMS) (Krutz, 2006). 
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The Profibus DP telegram header (11 bytes) and data field (variable length—
maximum of 244 bytes) is depicted in Figure 22. The header consists of the start 
delimiter (SD), the net data length (LE), the length repeated (LEr), destination 
address (DA), source address (SA), function code (FC), the destination service 
access point (DSAP), the source service access point (SSAP), the frame checking 
sequence (FCS), and the end delimiter (ED) (Acromag Incorporated, 2002).  
 
SD
1 octet
LE
1 octet
LEr
1 octet
DA
1 octet
SA
1 octet
FC
1 octet
DSAP
1 octet
SSAP
1 octet
DU
var
FCS
1 octet
ED
1 octet
 
Figure 22.  Profibus-DP (Message) Telegram Structure 
 
ControlNet 
 ControlNet is a token-passing bus control network protocol that is based 
on the IEEE 802.4 standard. The nodes in the token bus network are configured 
into a ring topology, and in particular, in ControlNet, each node knows the 
address of the preceding and succeeding nodes (Lian, Moyne, & Tilbury, 2001). 
The ControlNet protocol became a part of the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) 
family of protocols in 1997. 
The Medium Access Control (MAC) frame format transmitted on ControlNet is 
shown in Figure 23. The transmitted data, which could be as many as 510 bytes, is 
carried by a series of link packets (LPackets). A link packet can either be a Fixed 
Tag or a Generic Tag. The Fixed Tag LPackets are used for Unconnected 
Messaging and network administration while the Generic Tag LPackets are used 
for Connected Messaging. The link data field occupies 506 bytes in the fixed tag 
and 505 bytes in the generic tag (Schiffer, 2016). 
Figure 23. ControlNet MAC Frame Format (Schiffer, 2016) 
  
Preamble
Start 
Delimiter
Source 
Address
LPackets CRC
Start 
Delimiter
LPacket LPacket LPacket ... LPacket
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PLANS 
 This paper presented a review of industrial control protocols and the need 
for resources towards an in-depth understanding of ICS protocols. We cannot 
emphasize enough the fact that a solid understanding of the ICS protocols and 
architectures is essential to securing our critical infrastructures. We believe that 
this small contribution will provide indispensable materials in three areas of 
learning and research on ICS: digital forensics, cyber competitions, and deep 
packet inspection. 
The challenge for the authors will be in the expansion of the collection of ICS 
packet samples to cover the protocols that are just evolving such as those found in 
the Internet of Things (IoT) and the automotive controls systems. Additional 
future plans include: 
 Development of an intelligent attribution system utilizing the packet 
signature; and 
 Expansion of the ICS packet samples to include those that utilize the 
wireless network protocols.  
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